Europe likes to think it is safe and secure. In reality, much of its critical infrastructure is running on borrowed time. Old systems, fragmented responsibility, and perverse incentives have left a security debt that, if left unpaid, could affect millions of lives. Some sectors carry heavier debt than others, and the consequences of ignoring it grow by the day. Healthcare, energy, and transport carry the heaviest burdens.
The patient-facing nightmare
Hospitals and clinics are the most visible examples of this precarious state. Every day, lives depend on machines and systems conceived in a different era, when floppy disks were a mark of sophistication. Electronic health records, imaging machines, and ICU monitors often run on unsupported operating systems, and many hospitals are uncertain which devices are even connected to their networks. Vendors supplying medical technology have rarely been held accountable for security, and procurement contracts tend to value cost or certification above protection against cyberattacks.
In May 2021, Ireland’s Health Service Executive was paralysed by a Conti ransomware attack that froze IT systems nationwide, published confidential patient data, and imposed recovery costs exceeding €100 million. One can only imagine the pandemonium in hospitals as staff juggled paperwork in a world designed for glowing screens and automated alerts.
Fixing such messes is not simply a matter of money or willpower. Medical systems cannot be rebooted at will, and downtime can literally cost lives. Every upgrade must navigate a labyrinth of safety regulations, device certifications, and clinical approvals, each of which moves at the pace of a snail on a lazy Sunday. Budgets are fragmented between hospitals, regions, and ministries, meaning even when funding exists, it rarely aligns with the places that need it most. Staff are often already stretched thin, leaving little capacity to tackle a problem that does not have immediate, visible effects. Security is a long game, but healthcare lives in the perpetual now. In the meantime, IT teams often develop ingenious workarounds — the sort of clever, slightly terrifying duct tape solutions that would make a gnome engineer nod approvingly, and perhaps retire early to avoid existential despair.
Short-term improvements include mapping every device and isolating critical equipment on segmented networks, while ensuring administrative accounts are fortified with multi-factor authentication. Long-term remedies demand systemic change: procurement contracts that demand security, extending manufacturer liability, and national programmes to modernise or replace decades-old systems.
Fragile grids and pipes
The energy and utilities sector is the quiet giant that only becomes visible when it falters. Electricity, water, and gas systems are brittle, often decades old, and rarely prepared for malicious interference. Control systems for power plants, water treatment, and gas pipelines were designed to function in an era when cyberattacks were the stuff of science fiction. Air-gapped systems are often “isolated in theory” but remain vulnerable, and specialists trained to secure industrial control systems are rarer than a sunny day in Aberdeen.
The NotPetya malware outbreak in 2017 offers a vivid warning: Maersk, a global shipping and logistics firm critical to European trade, saw its operations crippled when its systems were collateral damage. The attack spread via outdated Windows systems and knocked out operations at ports worldwide, forcing staff to resort to radios and handwritten notes to keep goods moving. Recovery costs climbed into the hundreds of millions, a stark lesson in how quickly a single worm can cascade across essential services.
Fixing these vulnerabilities is devilishly hard. SCADA and PLC systems are expensive, deeply embedded into operations, and not built to be swapped like components in a desktop computer. Operators fear that changing a single component could inadvertently halt production, or worse, create a hazard. Procurement cycles stretch over years, vendor lock-ins persist, and replacing technology requires coordination across dozens of plants, regulators, and engineers. Specialists capable of securing industrial systems are so scarce that when one finally appears, they are often whisked away before lunch by some other sector that will pay them slightly more, leaving the utility managers to balance the very real risk of cyberattack against the equally real risk of waking up to a power outage in the middle of winter.
Immediate measures include network segmentation, rigorous monitoring at the IT/OT interface, and strict change control. Long-term resilience requires phased modernisation, adoption of open standards, and a sustained investment in the few engineers capable of securing these industrial behemoths. It is the sort of challenge that would make a wizard rethink magic, except here the magic is patience, bureaucracy, and the occasional heroic caffeine-fuelled all-nighter.
Planes, trains, and ports
Europe’s transport networks are marvels of engineering, tangled with complexity, and irresistible to cybercriminals. Airports, railways, and ports are intricate systems of legacy signalling, booking platforms, and terminal controllers, each integrated with multiple suppliers and third-party providers, each connection a potential weak spot.
According to the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) Transport Threat Landscape report, ransomware attacks emerged as the most significant threat to the transport sector during 2022, surpassing data-related threats, which were the most significant threat in 2021. However, it is still assessed that ransomware groups remain opportunistic and relatively indiscriminate in their future targeting. The report identifies prime threats, major trends observed with respect to threats, threat actors, and attack techniques, and also describes relevant mitigation measures.
Fixing these systems is as much a political puzzle as it is a technical one. Multiple stakeholders — operators, regulators, contractors, and local authorities — slow decision-making to a glacial pace. Safety regulations are intentionally conservative; no regulator wishes to approve a security upgrade that might inadvertently cause a derailment or a runway mishap. Legacy systems are deeply intertwined with national and cross-border standards, meaning a patch or replacement in one location can ripple unpredictably across networks and jurisdictions. Even when the threat is understood and funding exists, bureaucracy, legal liability, and sheer interdependencies make decisive action resemble a slow-motion game of Jenga played on a moving train.
For now, risk assessments, supplier audits, and incident response plans provide immediate defence. Long-term security will demand harmonised regulations, dedicated funding, and the political will to nudge a hundred moving parts into alignment. One can almost hear the sighs of weary IT managers across the continent, wondering whether they are administrators, diplomats, or circus performers, juggling flaming swords in a room full of sleeping tigers.
The reasons the debt lingers
Europe tolerates this mounting risk because it has created a maze with no single exit. Legacy systems endure because they were built for another age. Regulations exist, but translating EU rules into national law is slow and inconsistent.
Knowledgeable cybersecurity professionals are scarce — certified professionals and compliance officers are simply not enough to tackle these debts. Budgets are too thin, and procurement practices favour cheap compatibility over security by design. Attempting to change this is a bit like trying to convince a dragon to give up hoarding gold: theoretically possible, but practically exhausting.
Governance is fragmented across EU, national, and regional layers, leaving no one empowered to act decisively. It is a bureaucratic comedy of errors, and the punchline is that real lives are sometimes caught in the act.
Bottom line
Europe’s security debt is immense and hazardous. Healthcare, energy, and transport carry the heaviest burdens, directly threatening lives and essential services. Regulation such as NIS2 nudges the continent in the right direction, but without adequate funding, coordination, and operational support, the debt will persist.
The most effective remedy is to fund modernisation programmes, make procurement contracts enforceable for security, and hold vendors accountable. Otherwise, these rotten foundations will remain quietly, like a hidden trapdoor beneath the floorboards, until the next crisis exposes them with all the subtlety of a falling chandelier.